

Experience: Having It and Knowing It

Leopold Stubenberg

Before *The Analysis of Mind*

- Components of the Theory
 - sensibilia/sense-data
 - subject/self/mind/I
 - acts, e.g., sensing
 - acquaintance/awareness
- Questions:
 - where is the redness?
 - what is my experience of redness?
 - how do I know about my experience?

The Analysis of Mind

- neutral monism
 - NO subject/self/mind/I
 - NO act/sensing
 - NO acquaintance/awareness
 - NO sense-data
- sensibilia (?)
- *sensation = experience = patch*
 - “we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world. But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes...Accordingly THE SENSATION THAT WE HAVE WHEN WE SEE A PATCH OF COLOUR SIMPLY IS THAT PATCH OF COLOUR...and we may say that THE PATCH OF COLOUR AND OUR SENSATION IN SEEING IT ARE IDENTICAL.” (141-143)
- patch of color *embedded in a rich physiological & psychological structure* (functionalism?)
- red patch=red sensation: non-relational, therefore not knowledge
- knowing sensations via images that
 - are copies of the sensation
 - feeling of familiarity
 - feeling of pastness
 - accompanied by a memory belief
- is this knowledge direct/immediate?

- WE DO NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOW EITHER OUR OWN SENSATIONS OR ANYTHING ELSE...We are thus left with nothing immediate except the core of sensation, which is not knowledge, and is not itself immediately known. (“Physics and Perception”, CP9, 128-9)

- relation of sensation and image-copy:
 - structural similarity
 - *QUALITATIVE SIMILARITY*

Inquiry

- re-introduce duality
- noticing
 - not verbal description
 - not memory, verbal or imagistic
 - “the most immediate knowing of which we have experience.” (*Inquiry* 51)
 - most experiences unknown: unnoticed (and also unknown by other means)
- noticing: undefined term
 - experience: having ≠ noticing
 - a matter of degrees
 - isolation from sensible environment
 - attention
 - sharpening of the appropriate sense organs
 - emotional reaction (pleasure, displeasure, interest, boredom, surprise)
 - ≠description; ≠memory
- noticing does the job of acquaintance
 - epistemic: basis of empirical propositions
- questions about noticing
 - Is it a mental act?
 - what are its objects?
 - what does the noticing?
 - bundle selves and simple selves?
 - noticing and the principle of acquaintance

Acquaintance & Noticing: What Do They Explain?

- noticing
 - we know what it is supposed to do
 - we do not learn how it is supposed to work
 - deus es machina?

- acquaintance
 - THE FACULTY OF BEING ACQUAINTED WITH THINGS OTHER THAN ITSELF IS THE MAIN CHARACTERISTIC OF A MIND. Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes THE MIND'S POWER OF KNOWING THINGS. (*Problems 66-7*)
 - there is no how about it
 - is this an explanation/supposed to be an explanation
 - or merely an acknowledgement of the facts as we find them
 - should we expect more?

Back to *The Analysis of Mind*?

- Immediate memory
 - Between memory-image and sensation there is an INTERMEDIATE EXPERIENCE CONCERNING THE IMMEDIATE PAST. For example, A SOUND THAT WE HAVE JUST HEARD IS PRESENT TO US IN A WAY WHICH DIFFERS BOTH FROM THE SENSATION WHILE WE ARE HEARING THE SOUND AND FROM THE MEMORY-IMAGE OF SOMETHING HEARD DAYS OR WEEKS AGO...Everyone knows the experience of NOTICING (say) that the clock *has been* striking, when we did not notice it while it was striking... A sensation fades gradually, passing by continuous gradations to the status of an image. THIS RETENTION OF THE IMMEDIATE PAST IN A CONDITION INTERMEDIATE BETWEEN SENSATION AND IMAGE may be called "IMMEDIATE MEMORY." (174-5)

- notice "noticing"
- simple
 - no feelings of familiarity and pastness
 - no memory belief
 - no image
 - no sensation

- *PRESENT TO US*
- *RETENTION OF THE IMMEDIATE PAST*

- a way of "knowing" our sensations close enough to
 - knowledge by acquaintance
 - knowledge by noticing